Goal-oriented, rational threat agents attack a complex ICT infrastructure by composing elementary attacks against distinct components into an attack chain or attack plan. To compute statistics on the success probabilities of these plans, we have designed and implemented Haruspex, a tool that implements a Monte Carlo method by simulating the agent plans. A proper set of Haruspex experiments returns a set of data to compute statistics on the agent plans and their success probabilities even before deploying a system. In this way, we can assess with high confidence the robustness of a system and the risk it poses by considering scenarios where it is attacked by a set of agent. To fully automate the assessment, we have developed GVScan, a tool that maps the output of a vulnerability scanning into the inputs of Haruspex. This paper describes both Haruspex and GVScan and their adoption to assess the control plant of a power generation system.
INTRODUCTION
Mostly goal-oriented, rational threat agent achieves their goals through attack chains or plans. As an example, a plan against an ICT infrastructure, e.g. a cloud system, may begin with an attack against a mail server to send some malware to some trusted clients of the infrastructure. After installing the malware, the next step in the plan uses the clients to attack some infrastructure node. Then, the plan may implement a privilege escalation and so on. Given the complexity of ICT infrastructures and the large number of factors that determine the success of a plan, currently plans and their success probabilities are discovered experimentally. To overcome this constraint, we have adopted a Monte Carlo strategy to produce samples for the statistics to assess a scenario where some agents attack the infrastructure.
To automatically implement this solution, we have developed a set of tools to build the scenario description and then run the Monte Carlo method. The first tool, GVScan, builds the description of the target infrastructure starting from the output of a vulnerability scanner. Then, the second tool, Haruspex, implements an experiments consisting of several simulations, or runs, each mimicking the behavior of a set of threat agents that try to achieve some goals. Each agent starts with a set of privileges and has access to some information on the target system. At each simulation step, at first Haruspex computes the vulnerabilities the threat agents discover. Then, it simulates the attacks in the plan each agent selects and implements to increase its privileges. Based on the success probability of the selected attack, Haruspex computes whether the attack is successful and, in this case, it grants to the implementing agent the proper privileges that the agent will acquire, and may use, in the next attack.
The simulation ends when either all the agents have reached their goals or a time limit has been reached. In each run, Haruspex collects samples to compute the statistics of interest. Since each run contributes to each statistics with one sample, the confidence in the statistics increases with the number of runs. By properly tuning this number, an experiment can collect enough data to assess the security of the target infrastructure, even before its deployment. As an example, in this way alternative version of a system can be compared to discover the most cost effective one.
The remaining of this paper consists of six sections. Section 2 reviews related works on vulnerabilities, attack graphs, and attack simulations. Section 3 introduces the formal description of a scenario including both the ICT target system and the threat agents. Section 4 describes our tool GVScan to automatically provide the scenario description for Haruspex. Section 5 shows the attack plans description and how an agent selects a plan. Section 6 outlines the assessment of an ICT system that supervises and controls a power generation plan. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
RELATED WORKS
Attack graph are the most popular formalism to represent attack plans (Wang and Daniels 2008) . With respect to other formalisms, such as (Bouissou and Bon 2003; Merrick and Parnell 2011) , attack graphs consider the worst scenarios where an agent can exploit any vulnerability. This simplifies the discovery of plans sharing some attacks and attach graphs have been used to assess a system under attack and to select countermeasures (Diamant 2011) . Defense graphs (Sommestad et al. 2008 ) model the success probability of attacks. Rational agent have been analyzed with reference to terrorism (Buede et al. 2012) . Previous work (Gorodetski and Kotenko 2002) has investigated the simulation of attacks against ICT or critical infrastructures. (Gordon and Loeb 2002) discusses the optimal security investment. With respect to our previous papers that have presented our two tools (Baiardi et al. 2013b; Baiardi and Sgandurra 2013 ) the original contribution of this paper is their integration to automatically assess an infrastructure and a case study.
DESCRIBING A SCENARIO
This section outlines the most important information in a scenario description. In the following, we show that this description may be built by mapping the output of a the vulnerabilities enabling at pre(at) the rights to execute at res(at) the resources to execute at post(at) the rights acquired if at is successful succ(at) the success probability of at AttGr(S, ag) the attack graph with the plans of ag against S n a node of AttGr(S, ag) r(n) the rights paired with the node n λ(ag) the look-ahead of ag na(ag) the number of attacks ag executes before a new selection vulnerability scanner. First of all, we introduce the definitions of interest. Table 1 defines the acronyms used in this paper.
A scenario describes S, the system to be assessed, and the agents that attack S. We have adopted a modular description of S that does not require information on the overall behavior of S or on the agents. Instead, it decomposes S into components that are described in terms of operations, vulnerabilities and elementary attacks. Vulnerabilities enable the elementary attacks that enable the agents to illegally acquire some privileges, eg access rights or rights. Distinct components may be affected by the same or by distinct vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability may be known or suspected. While S is surely affected by any known vulnerability, each suspected one is paired with a probability distribution of being discovered at time t that may be deduced through information on the component and on the supplier/developer of the component. An attack at is paired with pre and post condition that describes, respectively, the rights requested to implement the attack and those granted if it is successful. A threat agent, or agent (ag), is one instance of a threat, e.g. an attacker of S with the intent and the capability to violate the security policy of S to reach some goal g, a set of rights. g may be paired with a benefit for ag and a corresponding loss for the owner of S that occurs when, and if, ag owns the rights in g. The description of ag includes its goals, the resources it can access and the initial rights, e.g. the operations ag is entitled to invoke.
Agents are rational and adaptive as they minimize the number of attacks in a plan and select a plan according to the goal of interest and the attack that can be implemented.
As an example, ag may be a terrorist that aims to shut down some critical components of an ICT system to damage or destroy the production plants it controls.
BUILDING THE SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
We discuss the design of GVScan (Baiardi et al. 2013a) , our tool that builds the description of the target system, of its components, their vulnerabilities and the corresponding attacks. Since most of the scenarios of interest for an assessment differ because of the agents, the availability of a tool such as GVScan strongly reduces the complexity of the assessment. A further advantage is that an automatic tool increases the accuracy of the description and the size of the system that can be described.
The input of GVScan is a MySQL database with all the vulnerabilities in the various components running on the various nodes of S. The database is the output of the vulnerability scanning of each node. Distinct scanners can be applied, e.g. Nessus, to distinct nodes and the user can insert, remove or edit, any vulnerability. GVScan discovers correlated set of vulnerabilities where two vulnerabilities are correlated if the attacks they enabled can be sequentialized in a plan. A set of correlated vulnerabilities is also referred as a global vulnerability. By discovering the global vulnerabilities of S, GVScan computes most of the information to describe S to Haruspex.
The analysis of GVScan is built around a classification of each vulnerability in the input database into one of seven classes (see Table 2 ) according to the attacks it enables. Each vulnerability is classified according to its Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) description. The CVE is a publicly available list or dictionary of standardized identifiers for vulnerabilities and exposures. The adopted classification makes it possible to determine the pre and post conditions of the attacks that each vulnerability enables. This classification also determines the pre and post conditions of each attack and its success probability. We refer to (Baiardi et al. 2013b ) for a detailed discussion of the classification and of the current implementation.
GVScan can works in three modes. In the standalone version, GVScan computes the attack surfaces of each node and then it discovers any global vulnerability. The second mode is the most useful for an Haruspex scenario, because it returns the description of S that is fed to Haruspex. In this mode, at first GVScan computes the attack surfaces of each node in S. This information merges attack post conditions and interconnection topology to discover the nodes that can be attacked from a given one. This information is fundamental to discover alternative plans of an agent. After computing the attack surfaces, GVScan returns any vulnerability in each component of S, the elementary attacks it enables and its pre and post conditions. In the third and last mode, the user specifies some agents, their initial rights and their goals. Starting from this input, GVScan discovers the global vulnerabilities that enable the attack plans that each agent may use to achieve its goals. In the first and last mode the user can bound the length of a plan to neglect those that are too long so that their success probability is so low and they may be neglected.
SELECTING AND IMPLEMENTING ATTACK PLANS
This section briefly defines plans and how an agent selects the plan it implements. Then, it briefly discusses how a Monte Carlo method that simulates the agent behavior may return statistics to support a probabilistic risk assessment.
A plan is an ordered sequence of distinct elementary attacks such that:
i. ag acquires the rights to implement the i − th attack through the previous i − 1 attacks; ii. ag achieves one goal at the end of the sequence.
The attacks in a plan are distinct because there is no benefit in repeating a successful attack. As an example, assume that ag aims to read and update a database in a node n of S. To achieve this goal, ag at first exploits a vulnerability in a distinct node n of S, to attack n and gain access to an account. Through this account, ag launches n against n to control a further account on this. From this account, ag launches a privilege escalation attack to become the administrator of the database in n . The three attacks build a plan pl to achieve the goal of controlling the database. Obviously, distinct plans for the same or other goals can share any of the three attacks. In the following, a subplan is a sequence containing the last attacks in a plan.
Haruspex builds an attack graph that represents all the (sub)plans of an agent anytime the agent has to select the (sub)plan to implement.
Selecting a Plan
Provided that the current security status of S enables some attacks that ag has not successfully implemented yet, ag can select one (sub)plan and implement the corresponding attacks. Meanwhile, some suspected vulnerabilities may be discovered. Hence, after implementing some attacks ag may select another plan for the same goal. As an example, in the previous example ag may select pl even if some the vulnerabilities the third attack have not been discovered yet. However, ag may reconsider its selection after attacking n and select another plan to control the database.
This shows that, besides their goals, agent are also characterized by their strategy to select a (sub)plan and by the number of attacks they implement before applying this strategy. The selection strategy defines how ag balances costs and benefits of alternative plans. While the number of alternative strategies is unbounded, most of them share a parameter, which we define as λ(ag) or the look-ahead of ag. λ(ag) defines the amount of information that ag considers when selecting a plan. If λ(ag) = 0, then ag neglects any information about S and randomly selects one of the attacks enabled by the current rights of ag even if it surely fails because some suspected vulnerability has not been discovered yet. If λ(ag) > 0, then ag always selects a subplan starting with an attack that is enabled by the known vulnerabilities of S and by the current rights of ag. If such a subplan does not exist, then ag is idle, otherwise ag executes the first attack of the subplan. The strategy may consider, among others, the success probability of attacks or the impact of the goal of a plan. In any case, the selection only considers the first λ(ag) attacks of the subplan. As an example, if λ(ag) = 1, then ag ranks subplans according to their first attack while it considers the first two attacks if λ(ag) = 2. The strategy of ag fully exploits any information on a plan only if λ(ag) is at least equal to the length of the longest plan of ag.
As an example, if ag selects the plan with the best success probability and λ(ag) = 2, then ag considers the joint success probabilities of the first two attacks in each subplan. If the second attack is not enabled yet, then the strategy also takes into account the probability that the proper vulnerabilities are discovered before the attack has to be executed. Obviously, if a subplan only includes one attack at, ag only consider succ(at, ag).
The behavior of ag depends upon a further parameter, na(ag), the numbers of attacks ag executes before applying the strategy. Hence, ag implements at most na(ag) attacks of the selected plan before applying again the strategy. Lower values of na(ag) enables ag to better exploits vulnerabilities discovered after the last selection. Obviously, ag selects another subplan if the next attack in the current one is not enabled yet. Currently, Haruspex can pair each agent with one of the following strategies: a) Random: it selects each plan with the same probability, b) Max Probability: it selects the plan with the highest success probability, c) Max Increment: it selects the plan granting the largest number of rights, d) Min Difference: it selects the plan granting the set most similar to a goal.
Success Probability of a Plan
We define pr(pl, ag), the success probability of a plan pl of ag, as the probability that ag selects and successfully implements pl. This probability determines, among others, the probability that ag achieves g, the impact due to ag and the overall one. pr(pl, ag) is related to a large number of factors such as: 1) the probability of discovering the vulnerabilities that enables the attacks in pl, 2) alternative plans enabled by the same vulnerabilities, 3) the success probabilities of the attacks in pl, 4) λ(ag) and of na(ag).
These relations strongly increases the complexity of computing pr(pl, ag). For these reasons, Haruspex adopts a Monte Carlo method that implements several independent runs, each simulating a set of agent for the same interval of time.
Simulating the Agent Plans
At each time tick of a run, Haruspex determines the suspected vulnerabilities that are discovered, according to the corresponding probability distributions. Then, it considers an idle agent ag that has to reach at least one goal and applies the selection strategy of ag, with its parameters λ(ag) and na(ag) to determine the subplan, and hence the attack at that ag implements. Then, ag is busy for all the time to implement at. Haruspex determines the success of at according to succ(at, ag). After having considered any idle agents, Haruspex checks whether some agent has terminated an attack and achieved a goal. In this case, it records the agent, the goal and the time. Then, the next time tick is considered.
At the end of a run, Haruspex records in a database information on the plans that have been successfully implemented, the components that have been attacked, the attacks that have been executed, the agent goals that have been reached. Then, the state of S and of each agent is initialized and a new, independent run starts. At the end of the experiment, the database returned by Haruspex is used to compute the statistics of interest. As an example, the success probability of a plan is computed as the percentage of runs where the plan has been successfully implemented. The number of runs in an experiment may be fixed in advance or a new run may be started till reaching the required confidence level on some statistics.
A CASE STUDY
This section describes the automatic assessment of an experimental IT infrastructure (Fovino et al. 2010 ), a supervision and control system in a thermoelectric plant for electric power production. We have used GVScan to automatically build the scenario description and then Haruspex to simulate the agent plans.
The Target System
The target system consists of 30 nodes in three subnets: the Intranet network, the process network and the control one. The Intranet is connected to the process network through a firewall and a distinct firewall connects the process network to the control one. Each firewall filters and route messages between the subnets. Each subnet is flat as any distinct couple of its nodes can interact. The business processes of the organization use the Intranet network that interfaces the nodes in an external production plant with access privileges to nodes in the control network. This subnet has 6 nodes, and its main components are a Windows Domain and two VPN Clients that remotely access the process network. The 17 nodes in process network run SCADA servers and clients, which act as the supervision and control system of the power production process. Some nodes are redundant for safety reasons. Lastly, the 7 nodes in the control network simulate the electric power production plant through proper hydraulic circuits and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). The agents aim to control the PLCs to fully compromise the power plant production.
Results of the Assessment
The whole system is affected by about 2700 local vulnerabilities, i.e. about 900 local vulnerabilities per subnet. The Windows domain server is the Intranet node with the largest number of vulnerabilities, in the considered case 61. The process network node with the largest number of vulnerabilities, 634, is the ASC server. Finally, the PLCs are the control network nodes with the largest number of vulnerabilities, 10. GVScan has not classified 79 out of the 2700 vulnerabilities due to their informal description. Any other vulnerability has been correctly classified. Table 2 shows the distribution of the vulnerabilities among the seven classes. The target system is vulnerable to remote code execution with Admin privileges and several plan include the attacks enabled by vulnerabilities such as man in the middle and local privilege escalation that enable the agent to control of the affected node.
To support the assessment of the target system, we have run about 20 experiments where we feed to Haruspex the output of GVScan. Taking into account the system topology, each experiment considers three agents that initially control a node in, respectively, the Intranet network, the process network, and the control one. For each Haruspex selection strategy, we have run experiments with λ(ag) ∈ {1, 3}. λ(ag) = 1 models an attacker that lacks information on the system to build and evaluate long plans. If, instead, λ(ag) = 3, ag is an insider that knows an optimal plan to control the PLCs. The system behavior is simulated for one year. To achieve a confidence level of at least 95%, each experiment consists of 10K simulations. Table 3 shows some statistics computed through the samples returned by Haruspex. The three values in each cell refer to agents starting, respectively, from the Intranet, the process, and the control Network.
According to these statistics, an agent with the proper information on the target system can reach its goal with a few attacks. In fact, the average length of successful plans is 3 if ag can access the Intranet subnet and λ(ag) = 3. For any other agent, reaching a goal is more complex. As shown in Table 3 , an agent starting from the Intranet subnet needs several attacks before discovering the proper plan. As a further example, an agent owning some rights on the VPN client in the Intranet can control a SCADA server through a vulnerability of the SMB protocol, which enables a remote
